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The  basic  pattern  of decision-making  through  power  clusters
continues.  Two  basic truths dominate  the American  political  sys-
tem.
First,  the Constitution  of  the  United States,  in establishing  a
federal  system with  a separation  of powers,  creates  a political  en-
vironment which limits us to a two party system and  compels both
major political  parties  to  be arenas  of compromise.  Both  political
parties exhibit four central  characteristics.
They are  united to win office.  Policy  is a product  of compro-
mise within the party, not a cause of association.
They are multi-group  associations.  People identify with a par-
ty for many different reasons.
They  are  decentralized.  Power  rests  at  the  county  level.
Neither state nor national party organizations  or leaders  can  disci-
pline local organizations,  candidates,  or office holders.
They are semi-public.  Government, most commonly the states,
sets  organizational  structure  and  membership  requirements,  con-
ducts  the nominating process,  and regulates  finance.  Yet the  par-
ties retain private attributes.  They select their own officers,  take
their own stands on public  policy,  and, except  for presidential  nom-
inees, raise their own funds.
Second,  public  policy making  is  segmented  and  decentralized.
The nation uses a system of power clusters, organized  around broad
subject  areas including  agriculture,  natural  resources,  health,  edu-
cation,  defense,  transportation,  justice  and  law  enforcement,  and
others which operate in relative  isolation from one another.  Within
each power cluster the executive  agencies, legislative  standing com-
mittees  and  appropriations  subcommittees,  organized  interest
groups,  professionals,  certain  special  individuals,  and  an  attentive
public interact to identify problems, settle upon acceptable solutions,
and provide the resources  to carry out the decisions.  By tacit mu-
tual consent,  the people  in each cluster stay out of the business  of
every  other cluster.
3I  want  now  to  discuss  three  recent  changes  in  the  federal
policy-making  process:  the new  congressional  budget system,  zero-
base budgeting,  and the Domestic  Council.  I  also want to comment
briefly on  the weak congressional  liaison system the Carter  admin-
istration has been using  and its implications  for policy making.
The  New  Congressional  Budget System
On  July  12,  1974,  at the height  of  the Watergate  crisis, react-
ing to impoundments by President Nixon of funds Congress had ap-
propriated  for various  purposes  and  to  the  President's  refusal  to
divulge  information,  Congress  enacted  the  Congressional  Budget
and  Impoundment  Control  Act  of  1974.  The  act  gave  Congress  a
central system for setting overall budget ceilings,  changed  the fed-
eral  fiscal  year so  Congress  would  be  able  to  enact  all  appropria-
tions  bills before  each year started,  and established  a Congressional
Budget  Office.
The  new  budget  system  enables  Congress  to  offer  a  compre-
hensive  alternative  to  the  President's  budget.  By  May  15  each
year, Congress  adopts a First Budget  Resolution,  using the concur-
rent  resolution  procedure  so  the  President  is  not  involved.  The
resolution  sets  tentative  target  figures  in  the  forthcoming  fiscal
year for total new obligational authority,  total expected expenditur-
es  (outlay),  anticipated  revenues,  and  the  level  of the  public  debt
which  will  be permitted,  including  any planned  increase.
The Budget Resolution also assigns targets to each of 17 "budg-
et  functions"  which  are  then  translated  into  targets  for  each  of
the  13  subcommittees  on appropriations.  The subcommittees  may
recommend  changes  in the targets, but there  is enormous  pressure
upon  them to meet  the targets  or come  in below  them.
By  September  15,  after  the  13  appropriations  bills  have been
considered  by both the House  and the Senate but before their final
enactment,  the  Second Budget  Resolution  is  adopted  which  can  in-
corporate  changes  recommended  by  the  subcommittees.  The  ap-
propriations  bills  are then  enacted  in  time to  start  the  new  fiscal
year October 1.
The  new  budget  system  thus  reenforces  the  existing  power-
cluster  system  of  decision-making  while  giving  Congress  control
over  general  fiscal  policy.  The  power  clusters  retain  their  influ-
ence  in  two significant ways.  First, each  subcommittee  retains  its
jurisdiction  over  a  part of the  executive  branch  and  the  power  to
make decisions  in its own  subject field.  Second, the power  clusters
are carefully  represented  on  the House  Budget  Committee.  Its 23
members are composed  of 5 representatives  from the Appropriations
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11  standing  committees,  and  one  each  representing  the  majority
and  minority  leaders.  Each  subcommittee,  then,  operates  to  pro-
tect  its  piece  of  the  total  budget  melon,  in  collaboration  with  its
sister standing committee,  but really  is  in  no  position  to carve  out
additional  pieces  from  the  shares  which  belong  to  other  clusters.
Thus shifts of funds may be made within each subcommittee's juris-
diction,  but  are  very  difficult  to  accomplish  across  subcommittee
lines.  This problem  has been reflected every year in the vote on the
First Budget  Resolution  in  the House.  Liberal  Democrats  who fa-
vor shifting funds from defense to social services and anti-recession
economic  measures  have  joined  Republicans  who  want  to  cut  the
budget to oppose the Budget Resolution.  In 1975 this coalition very
nearly defeated the Resolution.  In 1977  the vote was 221  to 177.
The  new budget system also requires  the President to submit  a
"Current  Services  Budget"  by  November  10 each  year,  well before
he submits  his regular budget request.  This budget estimates  the
cost of continuing all  existing programs  at current levels, assuming
no  policy  changes,  in the  next  fiscal year.  Congress  thus  has the
base from which  to undertake  its own  incremental  budget  system.
The  new  system worked  remarkedly  well  in  its first  real  test
for FY 1977.  The First Budget Resolution  was adopted  on  May  13,
1976,  two days  before  the scheduled  time.  It offered  a significant
alternative to the Ford budget, increasing total outlays by $17.5  bil-
lion  and  shifting  the  internal  allocation  away  from  defense  and
toward  social services  and anti-recession  measures.  The appropria-
tions  subcommittees adhered  to their targets and only minor chang-
es  were  required  for the  Second  Budget  Resolution.  The  most  im-
portant  change was a further cut in military spending.  The Second
Budget Resolution  was  adopted  September  10,  five days  before the
deadline.  Every appropriations  bill was enacted  into  law before the
start of the fiscal  year on October  1.  No one  could  remember  such
an event in a generation.
In  the  Senate,  the  Republican  minority  participated  in  the
budget preparation  and the budget resolutions became  non-partisan.
In 1975  the  First Resolution passed  67  to 22;  in  1976  it  passed  62
to 22;  and  in  1977 it passed  54  to 23.
In the House,  however,  most Republicans  have  regularly  voted
against  the  Budget  Resolution,  making  its adoption  a  partisan  is-
sue.  Indeed,  no  Republican  House  conferee  had  even  signed  the
conference  report until this year,  when half  of them, two members,
did so.
The system continues to work for FY  1979.  The House  passed
5the First Budget Resolution  May  17, 1977; the Senate  acted on May
13.
The  challenge  for  President  Carter  is  how  to  integrate  the
congressional  budget  system  and  the  presidential  budget  system.
As a  Democratic  President with a Democratic  Congress,  he can  af-
ford the customary minor adjustments  which the subcommittees  on
appropriations  regularly make in his detailed recommendations.  But
he can  ill afford to have the Congress  set significantly different tar-
get figures  concerning total  fiscal  policy.  Prudence  would  seem to
suggest  that  he  should consult  the leaders  of the two budget  com-
mittees  early each  year to reach  agreement  on at  least the key tar-
get figures  on  outlay,  expenditures,  revenue,  and  debt so  that the
Democratic  party can  present a united front of fiscal responsibility
to  the  American  people.
Zero-Base  Budgeting
President  Carter's  inauguration  of  zero-base  budgeting,  how-
ever,  suggests  that  he may not see  the need  for close coordination
with  the  Congress  on  budget  matters.  In  1971,  shortly  after  be-
coming  Governor of Georgia,  Carter instituted  zero-base  budgeting
throughout  the  state  government.  His  success  in  improving  his
state's budgeting system and in getting program managers involved
in hard-nosed  budgeting  has led him to  apply the system  in Wash-
ington.
Zero-based  budgeting, as practiced  in Georgia,  has two distinc-
tive  characteristics.  First,  budget requests  are  formulated  in "de-
cision  packages"  in  each  management  unit.  A  minimum  package,
in which  all existing functions must be justified at the lowest  prac-
tical  level  of operation,  forms  the first  block.  Additional  decision
packages offer more program results for greater costs, bringing the
total budget proposals to successively higher levels - some just be-
low the current level,  one which  might be at the exisiting level,  and
others  which  represent  increased  support.  Second,  each  unit man-
ager ranks all  "decision  packages"  by priority  and  each  successive-
ly  higher manager  similarly  ranks  packages  across  program  lines
clear to the top of the organization.  Thus each marginal  increment
of budget can  be placed on the next most important activity.
The  zero-base  budgeting  memorandum  issued  by  Budget  Di-
recor Burt Lance  on April  19,  1977,  contains  the essential elements
of the "new"  zero-base  budgeting  system, but  also  revives most  of
the  attributes  of the  late,  unlamented  planning,  programming,  and
budgeting  system  inaugurated  by President  Lyndon  B.  Johnson  in
1965.
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reasons.  First, and most important, it attempted to substitute eco-
nomic  decision  making  for  political  decision  making.  Allocating
who  gets how  much  for what is at  the very  heart of  the political
process.  Congress  correctly refused  to use  PPBS.  Zero-base  budg-
eting is attempting the same substitution.
Second, PPBS tried to centralize budget decision-making  in the
Executive  Office  of  the President.  ZBBS  openly  makes  the  same
attempt.
Third,  PPBS  attempted  to  combine five  elements  of program
planning  and  budgeting  into  one  comprehensive  system,  applied
across  the board to  all federal  agencies:  goal  and objective  setting
(also called management  by objectives);  program accounting; bene-
fit-cost  analysis:  zero  base  budgeting;  and multi-year  costing.  A
simple  comparison  of  Director Lance's  April  19,  1977  bulletin with
the  Bureau  of  the  Budget's  "planning-programming-budgeting"
bulletin of  1965 reveals  that all of the  same  elements  of PPBS are
retained  in ZBBS.  Many of these tools are very  useful in selected
circumstances.  For example,  benefit-cost  analysis  is  very  helpful
in major go-no-go decisions  like whether to build a mutliple-purpose
water resources  project.  Used  across the board, they proved inap-
propriate and wasteful.
Fourth,  PPBS as  a process  was not  cost effective.  It  cost a
great deal  and produced  very little  in the way  of changed  budget
decisions.
Fifth,  PPBS attempted  too  much.  It went beyond  human ca-
pacity  to cope with the large number of inter-related decisions  pre-
sented.
Zero-base  budgeting  also  attempts  too  much.  Georgia  had
10,000  decision  packages.  The  federal  government  could  easily
have  100,000.  Moreover,  three-fourths  of  the  federal  budget  is
really  not controllable from year to year and most of these packag-
es are certain to be beyond negative  budget decisions.
Zero-base  budgeting,  then,  is an  attempt  to  substitute a com-
prehensive,  centralized  economic  analysis  system  of planning  and
budgeting for our incremental,  power-cluster  operated,  political  de-
cision-making  system.  Congress  is  no  more  likely  to  buy  ZBBS
than it bought PPBS.
The Domestic  Council
The  Domestic  Council,  formed  principally  under  President
Nixon  and  continued  by  Presidents  Ford  and  Carter,  offers  the
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ported by high-level  staff assistance.  But the staff of tlie  Council,
as it operated  under President Nixon at least, saw its duties as clari-
fying  policy  alternatives  which  the  President  had  requested  for
presidential  review  and  decision,  determining  priorities,  backstop-
ping the  President  on  emerging  "fire  engine"  issues,  collecting  in-
formation,  and occasionally  monitoring  agency activity.
In dealing with Congress,  the executive  agencies,  and the inter-
est groups,  however,  the  Domestic  Council staff correctly recogniz-
ed the operation of the power clusters.  Even so, the staff apparent-
ly did  not  perceive  that  they  needed  to  distinguish  between  policy
issues  which  could  be  adequately  developed  by  one  power  cluster
such as Agriculture  and  inter-cluster  issues which  the White House
needed  to meditate.  Indeed,  the staff itself began  to  specialize  by
subject matter, thus tending to join the power clusters rather than
moving to work across cluster lines.
The staff also began  to realize that everything  could not be re-
ferred to the President  and began moving toward making policy de-
cisions  themselves.  This,  of  course,  contributed  to  the  problems
which beset the Council.  Moreover,  some of these efforts appear to
have  been  directed  toward  intra-cluster  matters,  like  crime  in the
streets,  and  the  family  assistance  plan,  which  an  existing  power
cluster  was well  equipped  to manage.  A few,  like  revenue  sharing,
were  genuine  inter-cluster  policy  issues  and  the  staff  apparently
realized  they were engaged  in  a  mediating  role  when  they handled
them.
The  Council  staff, therefore,  did not  really seize  the opportun-
ity of initiating a forum for  resolving  key  inter-cluster  issues.  In-
stead, it acted  as another rather traditional  staff arm of the Presi-
dent and dissipated its efforts by entering intra-cluster fights.  Yet
the potential  on inter-cluster policy issues remains.  If the new lead-
ership  elects  to  focus  Council  attention  on  the substance  of inter-
cluster policy conflicts and  on developing effective  means of resolv-
ing such conflicts,  it could  make  a significant  advance  in American
government.
Executive-Legislative  Coordination
The return of a Democratic  administration  to the White House
this  year with  the  continuance  of  nearly  a two-thirds  majority  of
Democrats in Congress should have restored cordial cooperation be-
tween the executive  and  legislative  branches of  the federal  govern-
ment.  There are strong signs that this cooperation has not been es-
tablished.
8The first budget resolution makes a significant change in Presi-
dent  Carter's  recommended  levels  of  overall fiscal  policy.  Leaders
of several committees  have  been  outspoken  in their dissatisfaction
with Carter's proposals  in their areas of expertise and  have offered
alternative policies.  Especially  notable  have been conflicts over en-
ergy  and  taxation  policy.  Grumblings  are  widespread  on  Capitol
Hill that the recommendations  of leading Senators and  Representa-
tives have been ignored  in filling key posts  in the executive branch
and that after the initial Carter  appointments  were made, the new,
and relatively inexperienced,  administrators  have engaged  in crony-
ism to fill lesser appointive  posts.
All  this smacks  of amateurism  in  Congressional  liaison by the
White  House  staff.  The  symptoms  are those  of  a staff which  has
dealt with  the  Congress  as  though  they  were  unstaffed  part-time
state legislators.  The result has been highly displeasing to Congress
and highly disruptive for the President's  legislative  program.
Two quick steps might  change the  atmosphere  and  permit the
building of a constructive  relationship.  First, two or three carefully
selected  old Washington  hands who already enjoy the confidence  of
key  leaders  in  Congress  should  be  brought  into  the  White  House
staff to lead  the liaison  effort.  Second,  the President  should  open
discussions with the chairmen of the House  and Senate budget com-
mittees to establish the target numbers for fiscal 1979.  These num-
bers should be jointly agreed upon to guide both the Administration
in the preparation  of its  1979  budget  request  and  the Congress  in
the preparation  of its 1979  budget resolution.
The  initiative  to  bring  about  improved  relations  must  come
from the President.  How well he succeeds  in this task may well de-
termine how well he succeeds  in all his endeavors.
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